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Abstract
Observed events in recommendation are conse-
quence of the decisions made by a policy, thus
they are usually selectively labeled, namely the
data are Missing Not At Random (MNAR), which
often causes large bias to the estimate of true out-
comes risk. A general approach to correct MNAR
bias is performing small Randomized Controlled
Trials (RCTs), where an additional uniform pol-
icy is employed to randomly assign items to each
user. In this work, we concentrate on the fair-
ness of RCTs under both homogeneous and het-
erogeneous demographics, especially analyzing
the bias for the least favorable group on the lat-
ter setting. Considering RCTs’ limitations, we
propose a novel Counterfactual Robust Risk Min-
imization (CRRM) framework, which is totally
free of expensive RCTs, and derive its theoretical
generalization error bound. At last, empirical ex-
periments are performed on synthetic tasks and
real-world data sets, substantiating our method’s
superiority both in fairness and generalization.
1. Introduction
Conventional machine learning model, though can reach
high accuracy in average, often falls short in causing high
loss on minority groups at the same time. Fairness issues
have been studied in various tasks, like medical treatment,
criminal justice (Kearns et al., 2019; Nabi et al., 2018; Mary
et al., 2019), credit loan (Liu et al., 2018), machine transla-
tion (Hashimoto et al., 2018), recommender system (?Beutel
et al., 2019; Singh & Joachims, 2019), etc. The reasons for
improving model’s fairness are not limited with respect to
ensuring morality or legality , but also involving econom-
ical considerations. In (Hashimoto et al., 2018), it proves
the amplification of demographic disparity in sequential
ERM process. That is, the minority group which suffers
1Tsinghua-Berkeley Shenzhen Institute (TBSI), Tsinghua Uni-
versity, China 2Jarvis Lab, Tencent, China. Correspondence to:
Zifeng Wang <wangzf18@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>.
Work in progress.
Item 1 Item 2 Item 3
User 1 √ × ?
User 2 ? ? √…
Figure 1. Missing ratings in a recommender system.
higher loss will become more likely to quit using our service,
thereby providing no feedback data any longer. This nega-
tive feedback loop can cause shrinking size of users, hence
reducing the income or welfare provided by our machine
learning systems over time.
Specifically for recommender systems, there have been line
of work showing that, the real-world logging policy often
collects missing not at random (MNAR) (Yuan et al., 2019)
data (or selective labels). For example, users tend to only
reveal ratings for items they like, thus the observed users’
feedback (usually described by click-through-rate, (CTR))
can be substantially better than those not observed yet. In
Fig.1, estimated average CTR from the observed outcome is
2/3 ≈ 0.67. However, if all unobserved outcomes are 0, the
true CTR is 1/3 ≈ 0.33. This gap between the factual and
counterfactual ratings, in MNAR situation, has been empiri-
cally validated by (Steck, 2013). In this work, we show that
MNAR also undermines fairness of recommendation over
time, by exacerbating minority group’s utility.
To get unbiased estimate of true CTR without revealing
all feedback, running randomized controlled trials (RCTs)
(Haynes et al., 2012) has been so far the first choice, which
satisfies missing-at-random (MAR) (Seaman et al., 2013)
condition:
Definition 1 (Condition of MAR). The missing data are
missing-at-random (MAR) if the conditional probality of
observed pattern, represented by O here, satisfies
P(O | X = x) = P(O | X = x′) ∀x, x′ ∈ X (1)
However, the cost of RCTs is unacceptable in many scenar-
ios, e.g. we cannot randomly assign drugs to the volunteers,
or randomly display ads for users. Vast majority of existing
works (Shalit et al., 2017; Rosenfeld et al., 2017; Bonner &
Vasile, 2018) tend to leverage small RCTs and large biased
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Beyond Randomized Trials
logged data to correct the MNAR bias, through multi-task
learning or domain adaptation techniques. They claim that
small RCTs, though not capable of revealing each individ-
ual’s preference (Rosenfeld et al., 2017), are sufficient for
reaching low-variance estimate of the average of all, from
which we can obtain model that generalizes well to those
counterfactual events. However, the conception about small
is not well-defined yet, hence no guideline for proper num-
ber of RCTs to trade gain against cost. Besides, although
RCTs are intuitively regarded as fair for each user, we argue
that learning from the average from RCTs causes unfair
policy, on heterogeneous demographics, i.e. users vary over
populations defined by preferences.
In this work, we aim to mitigate utility disparity among
users, as well as improving global utility of all in recom-
mendation. Our object of interest is a RCTs-free method that
can achieve both two goals above. We begin from introduc-
ing Gini index (Gini, 1997) as a disparity measure in Section
4. In Section 5, we consider two heterogeneous situations,
for analyzing the RCTs’s fairness, accounting for the least
favorable group’s risk. Then, we propose our RCTs-free
Counterfactual Robust Risk Minimization (CRRM) frame-
work in Section 6, and test its performance in Section 7.
The proof of all propositions and theorems can be found in
appendices. And codes for experiments are available in the
supplementary material.
Contributions. Our main contributions are three-fold:
1. We demonstrate the unfairness of conventionally used
ERM-based recommendation under MNAR data, and con-
nect protecting the least favorable group to ensuring fairness
regarding to Gini index;
2. We are the first to theoretically analyze the fairness of
RCTs-based methods, e.g. IPS, by considering the least fa-
vorable group’s risk over multiple demographic conditions;
3. We develop a RCTs-free CRRM framework, and derive
a constructive theoretical error bound. Furthermore, our
method is empirically proved improving both fairness and
accuracy, on both synthetic tasks and real-world data.
2. Related work
Fair machine learning. Fairness in machine learning is an
emerging topic in the literature recently. The most direct
principle of algorithmic fairness is to protect sensitive tags,
features or labels, such as race, gender, age, etc. This for-
mulation of fairness has been investigated in (Hardt et al.,
2016; Mary et al., 2019) where the conditional indepen-
dence, between the decision made by the algorithm and the
variables to protect, is estimated or guaranteed. In other
respects, the Rawlsian fairness (Rawls, 2009) is introduced
to substantiate this equal opportunity principle in a bandit
learning scheme (Joseph et al., 2016; Jabbari et al., 2017),
where an action is preferred only if its true quality is better.
However, as far as we know, few work has ever mentioned
fairness issue in MNAR scenario.
For some scenarios when the demographics are unknown,
the previous works have been so far concentrating on protect-
ing subgroups with latent demographic structure (Kearns
et al., 2017), or learning a distributionally robust model
for uniform performance without knowing demographics
(Duchi & Namkoong, 2018; Hashimoto et al., 2018). Al-
though these approaches are proved to be able to protect the
minority group, no evident improvement of global utility
for all users is witnessed in practice.
Correcting MNAR bias. An importance sampling ap-
proach called inverse propensity score (IPS) is proposed
initially to correct the sampling bias (Rosenbaum & Rubin,
1983), then followed by line of work including doubly robust
(DR) (Dudı´k et al., 2011; Jiang & Li, 2015), weighted dou-
bly robust (Thomas & Brunskill, 2016), joint learning dou-
bly robust (Wang et al., 2019), self-normalized IPS (Swami-
nathan & Joachims, 2015; Schnabel et al., 2016), etc., for
recommendation on MNAR data, by utilizing additional
small RCTs. Besides, methods (Johansson et al., 2016;
Bonner & Vasile, 2018) adapted from domain adaptation
and representation learning techniques are used for learning
from both Dt and Dc. However, they hardly mention their
methods’ fairness, or the effectiveness over heterogeneous
demographics.
3. Problem Setup
Denote user u ∈ U , and item v ∈ V , then an even x ∈ U×V .
The outcome of an event is y ∈ Y = {0, 1} where
y =
{
0 if the event x was observed and clicked
1 if the event x was observed and not clicked
(2)
There are in total |U| × |V| possible events considering
different combination of users and items, where | · | here
means the cardinality of a set, we set |U| = M and |V| = N .
The true risk of predicted outcome matrix Yˆ ∈ RM×N can
be easily written out as
R(Yˆ ) =
1
MN
∑
u∈U
∑
v∈V
δ(yˆuv, yuv) (3)
where yuv is assumed drawn from a true outcome matrix
Y ∈ {0, 1}M×N , and δ(·) is usually set as surrogate mean-
squared-error, or logistic loss, for simplicity we denote it as
δuv or δx.
When some of outcomes are not observed, calculating Eq.(3)
becomes infeasible. Such that, previous works attempt to
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Observed 
(Factual)
Non-observed 
(Counterfactual)
Decision 𝑂௨௩ ∈ {0,1} made by policy 𝜙
on item 𝑣 if it is displayed
No failure
(𝑦 = 1)
Failure
(𝑦 = 0)
Unknown
(𝑦 = ?)
௨௩ ௨௩
Figure 2. A demonstration of MNAR problem.
only minimize the factual empirical risk, namely ERM as
RˆF (Yˆ ) =
1
|{(u, v);Ouv = 1}|
∑
(u,v):Ouv=1
δuv (4)
where random variable Ouv means whether a pair (u, v) is
observed. The observation of outcome yuv is hence con-
strained by the missing pattern Ouv, shown in Fig.2. Such
that, the RˆF (Yˆ ) is a biased estimate of true risk R(Yˆ ):
EO(RˆF (Yˆ )) 6= R(Yˆ ) (5)
3.1. Correcting sampling bias by propensity scores
To deal with the bias shown in Eq.(5), an unbiased inverse
propensity score (IPS) estimator (Rosenbaum & Rubin,
1983) can be built as
RˆIPS(Yˆ ) =
1
MN
∑
(u,v):Ouv=1
δuv
Zuv
(6)
where Zuv is the used propensity score that EO(Ouv) =
Zuv , hence it is easy to derive EO(RˆIPS(Yˆ )) = R(Yˆ ).
The propensity score Zuv here, can be approximated via a
simplified naive Bayes (NB) estimator (Marlin & Zemel,
2009) Zˆuv as following:
P(Ouv = 1 | Yuv = y) = P(Y = y | O = 1)P(O = 1)
P(Y = y)
(7)
with assuming that P(O | Y,X) = P(O | Y ). Though the
P(Y | O) and P(O) can be counted by MNAR data, the
P(Y = y) has to be estimated via MAR data, which is often
achieved by taking average of n RCTs’ outcomes
Y¯n =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Yi (8)
Using x = (u, v), the bias of IPS estimator with inaccurate
propensity Zˆx is given by (Schnabel et al., 2016) that
R(Yˆ )− EO(RˆIPS(Yˆ | Zˆ)) = 1
MN
∑
x
δx
(
1− Ox
Zˆx
)
(9)
For notation simplicity, we omit Zˆ of the RˆIPS(Yˆ | Zˆ)
from now on. In this work, we delve deeper into this bias,
accounting for the bias of different groups of users. We
assume that each individual u belongs to a group Ul, and
the group mean preference is represented by
µl := P(Y = 1 | u ∈ Ul) l = 1, . . . , L (10)
In this viewpoint, the Y¯n is an efficient empirical estimate of
global preference for all users. However, we question that,
when demographics are heterogeneous, i.e. µl are different,
is the Y¯n by RCTs still a fair and economical estimate?
Since for ensuring fairness, we care about loss suffered by
the least favorable group, rather than only the average over
all. To deal with this fairness issue, we first focus on how to
measure utility disparity among users in next section.
4. Measuring Utility Disparity by Gini Index
The conventional approach to update a policy for recom-
mender system, often proceeds in repeatedly learning from
the MNAR logged data, thus minimizing the empirical risk.
In this section, we identify that the policy φc obtained by
this process fails to offer fair services, when taking user’s
click-through-ratio (CTR) as their utility. We then propose
Gini index for measuring this disparity, and reveal the con-
nection between improving Gini fairness and protecting the
least favorable group’s utility.
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Figure 3. Analysis of simulation results of the motivating example.
4.1. Motivating example
We build a tiny system with 5 users and 5 items for simula-
tion, and compare the user-wise and item-wise numbers of
clicks achieved by φt and φc, shown in Fig.3. Unfair treat-
ment towards users by φc can be witnessed in the Fig.3a.
Compared with φt, though the total clicks achieved by φc is
slightly higher (2916 v.s. 2484), the click rates of user #1
and #2 are much lower than their counterparts by φt. That
means, the φc achieves good performance in average, at the
expense of deteriorating experience of the minorities. Be-
sides, the Fig.3b illustrates devastating diversity reduction
by φc, which is also unacceptable in recommendation. De-
tails about the implementation of simulation can be found
in Appendix F.1.
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4.2. Gini fairness and the minority’s utility
Example above impresses the necessity to measure users’
utility disparity. To this end, we introduce Gini index drawn
from Economics to measure fairness in recommendation.
The Gini index GI ∈ [0, 1], with 0 indicating perfect equal-
ity and 1 being perfect inequality, is a measure of the distri-
bution of income across percentiles among populations.
୪ିଵ
୪
௟
୐
Cumulative Utility
Cumulative Population
Figure 4. Computing the Gini index via the Lorenz curve.
To compute GI, the Lorenz curve (Mankiw, 2006) plots
population percentile by utility on the x-axis, and cumulative
utility on the y-axis. Denote the cumulative l-th group’s
utility as Cuml =
∑l
l′=1 µˆl′ . From Fig.4, we can compute
the area under the Lorenz curve SB by summation of all Sl
SB =
L∑
l=1
Sl =
1
2L
L∑
l=1
(Cuml−1 +Cuml) (11)
therefore the GI can be obtained by
GI :=
SA + SB − SB
SA + SB
= 1− 2
CumL
× SB
= 1− 1
L
L∑
l=1
1
CumL
(Cuml−1 +Cuml)
(12)
We give the following Proposition 1 which identifies the
connection between controlling Gini index and protecting
the least favorable group.
Proposition 1 (Least favorable group’s utility and Gini in-
dex). Assume that µˆ1 ≤ µˆ2 · · · ≤ µˆL, controlling the worst-
case µˆ1 to protect the minority group can improve fairness,
by virtue of controlling the supremum of the GI as
0 ≤ GI ≤ 1− 1
L
− L− 1
CumL
µˆ1 (13)
if and only if µˆ1 = µˆ2 = · · · = µˆL the equality holds.
Based on above analysis, picking the least favorable group’s
average utility can be a surrogate metric for fairness, since
the GI’s upper bound is restricted by µˆ1. By the Lorenz
curve of the motivating example in Fig.5, the φt has much
less Gini index than φc, and the minimum utility earned by
φt is larger than φc as well.
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Figure 5. The Lorenz curve of cumulative utility µˆ obtained by
policy φc and φt, e.g. in (a), the point (40%, 0.14) means the tail
two users obtain 14% of total utility; and in (b), the (40%, 0.36)
means 36% of total utility. The value of Gini index is defined as
the area of SA, therefore the φt is much more fair than φc.
Another concern is that the global utility gU, namely the
utility enjoyed by all users, is also important for evaluating
a policy’s effectiveness:
gU :=
1
L
CumL =
1
L
L∑
l=1
µˆl (14)
because it decides the total income of the system. Then
comes two principles for developing a recommender system:
1. Reduce Gini index GI (Eq. (12)) for fairness
2. Improve global utility gU (Eq. (14)) for effectiveness
We will use the above two metrics for comparison in the
experiment section.
5. Fairness of RCTs Considering
Heterogeneous Users Demographics
Recall that our goal is to control the utility disparity of
users, which can be realized by controlling the least favor-
able group’s utility µˆ1, as above mentioned in Eq.(13). We
proceed the analysis to fairness of RCTs-based methods in
two steps: first, we show how the empirical mean Y¯n influ-
ences the minority’s risk by IPS estimator; then, we analyze
this risk regarding to several demographics assumptions, i.e.
homogeneous and heterogeneous. As a result, we reveal the
limitations of these RCTs-based methods, even if the Y¯n by
RCTs is commonly regarded as trustworthy knowledge for
debiasing MNAR data in the literature.
5.1. Risk of the least favorable group
Let µ1 ≤ µ2 · · · ≤ µL, then the least favorable group is U1,
and the event set related to U1 is X1 = U1 × V . Bias of IPS
estimator on X1, similar to Eq.(9), can be derived as
Bias(RˆIPS(Yˆ | X1)) = R(Yˆ | X1)− EO(RˆIPS(Yˆ | X1))
=
1
|X1|
∑
x
δx
(
1− Ox
Zˆx
)
(15)
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Proposition 2 (Bias of the least favorable group’s risk by
IPS). The bias of IPS risk suffered by the least favorable
group U1, has a lower bound as
Bias(RˆIPS(Yˆ | X1)) ≥
(
1− Y¯n
µ1
)
1
|X1|
∑
x
δx (16)
Roughly speaking, the above inequality demonstrates that
the Y¯n’s property matters. In particular, even under uniform
policy, the bias for each group would be dependent on the
preference demographics, as shown next.
5.2. Homogeneity: same mean and same variance
Intuitively, when randomly assigning items for users, under
MAR condition, the Y¯n is a fair and efficient estimate for
debiasing. However, we argue that this only holds under
homogeneous and weak heterogeneous demographics.
Assumption 1 (Homogeneous demographics). Users’ pref-
erence are same mean and same variance, namely the
Yi ∼ F(µ, σ2) ∀i.
With above assumption, and by law of large numbers, it is
easy to get the consistency of Y¯n, i.e. Y¯n − µ p→ 0. Recall
the inequality in Eq.(16), the right term approaches to zero
at this situation because µ1 = µ, which holds for other
groups as well. That is the reason why in our motivating
example, uniform φt reaches good fairness. However, these
homogeneity hardly happen in practice. A real-world rec-
ommender system often serves hundred million of users,
such that it is reasonable to assume that the demographics of
users are highly heterogeneous. We discuss it by two cases
next, i.e. weak and strong heterogeneity.
5.3. Weak heterogeneity: same mean but different
variance
We begin our analysis from a simple case without loss
of generality, in which users are from two distributions:
F(µ0, σ20) and F(µ1, σ21), with probability p ∈ [0, 1] from
the first and 1 − p from the second one. Formally, this is
a common case in Robust Statistics (Maronna et al., 2019)
called contaminated distribution, as
Yi ∼ pF(µ0, σ20) + (1− p)F(µ1, σ21) (17)
For simplicity, we assume that both are Gaussian distribu-
tion (we will extend it to more general sub-Gaussian family
later). Based on Eq.(8) and Eq.(17), it is easy to derive that
E(Y¯n) = pµ0 + (1− p)µ1
Var(Y¯n) =
pσ20 + (1− p)σ21
n
(18)
We first consider the setting that groups’ preferences are
same mean but different variance (SMDV), namely µ0 =
µ1 = µ, and σ0 < σ1. We argue that only if variance is
controllable, the RCTs under SMDV demographics lead to
asymptotically normal and fair Y¯n:
Theorem 1 (Asymptotic normality under SMDV). Let
s2n =
∑n
i=1(pσ
2
0 + (1− p)σ21), under SMDV assumption, if
lim
n→∞
1
s2n
σ21 → 0 (19)
then the empirical mean Y¯n satisfies asymptotic normality
as
n
sn
(Y¯n − µ) d→ N (0, 1) (20)
Similar as in homogeneous demographics, with weak het-
erogeneity and mild condition on variance, the Y¯n also leads
to fair result.
5.4. Strong heterogeneity: different mean and different
variance
Although the above analysis proves that RCTs do lead to
fair estimator in theory, the fundamental challenge faced
is that, no matter for homogeneity or weak heterogeneity,
the same mean assumption seems to be too strong. This
argument urges us to explore more general setting, that is,
when the demographics are different mean and different
variance (DMDV), how well the Y¯n performs, in terms of
its bias and fairness. Accordingly, we continue to L DMDV
groups with sub-Gaussian assumption next.
Theorem 2 (Tail bound under strong heterogeneity). Given
the Yi ∼
∑L
l=1 plF(µl), where F(µl) ∈ [al, bl], then
Y¯n ≤
L∑
l=1
plµl +
L∑
l=1
pl(bl − al)
√
1
2n
log
1
η
(21)
with probability 1− η. Specifically when the sub-Gaussian
parameters are all same, i.e. bl − al = 1,∀l, we have
Y¯n ≤
L∑
l=1
plµl +
√
1
2n
log
1
η
(22)
Moreover, For the bias of IPS estimator on the least favor-
able group, we have
Bias(RˆIPS(Yˆ | X1))
≥
∑
x
δx
|X1| −
1
µ1
(∑
l
plµl +
√
1
2n
log
1
η
)∑
x
δx
|X1|
(23)
Above bound identifies that inaccurate propensities ob-
tained by NB estimator, with Y¯n from RCTs as the outcome
prior, contributes to unfair worst-case for different groups.
Though the RˆIPS(Yˆ ) is unbiased, its part on X1 is worse
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than other Xl, since the µl matters for the lower bound of
Bias(RˆIPS(Yˆ | Xl)).
Moreover, for other multi-task learning or domain adapta-
tion methods, we conjecture that this challenge appears as
well, because small RCTs are only competent for average
estimation, rather than representative for all groups. This
challenge encourages us to develop a machinery, which can
correct MNAR bias without RCTs, as well as achieving
better fairness for recommendation, described next.
6. Beyond Randomized Trials:
Counterfactual Robust Risk Minimization
Given a predictor f : X → R, we let PYˆ |X∈X1 :=
E(f(X) | X ∈ X1), and similar for the PYˆ |X/∈X1 . For
ensuring fairness on known demographics, the disparity
metrics are used by (?) to measure the outcome disparity
conditioned by predefined group:
|PYˆ |X∈X1 − PYˆ |X/∈X1 | (24)
However, demographics of user’s preference in recommen-
dation are usually unknown, thus defining groups and opti-
mizing the Eq.(24) directly is difficult.
To deal with unknown demographics, distributionally robust
optimization (DRO) is employed for controlling the least
favorable group’s risk by (Hashimoto et al., 2018), while
some concerns are (1) the importance sampling scheme in-
troduces additional variance in optimization; (2) the result is
sensitive to the distance metric for defining the uncertainty
set and (3) the DRO often degenerates to ERM (Hu et al.,
2018) in many scenarios. In this section, we propose a more
easy-to-use and effective counterfactual robust risk mini-
mization framework, aiming at reducing utility disparity
without knowing demographics. We first present the defini-
tion of objective function and algorithm of the framework,
then give its theoretical generalization error bound.
6.1. Counterfactual robust risk minimization
We define the conception of individual fairness, that is, for
similar users, the predictor is ought to give similar outputs.
Hence we introduce the so-called robust risk that
δ˜x := max‖x′−x‖≤ξ
KL(f(x; Θ) ‖ f(x′; Θ)) (25)
where the predictor f is parametrized by Θ1, and the adver-
sarial input x′ is restricted in a ball, with radius ξ around the
original input x. As aforementioned, high utility disparity is
often caused by ERM, because the predictor tends to overes-
timate the factuals, and generalize badly on counterfactuals.
1We can pick the matrix factorization (Koren et al., 2009) here,
such that x is an embeddeding vector looked up from Θ.
Algorithm 1 Mini-batch SGD learning for CRRM
1: Input: Event sets DF , DCF ; Batch size B0, B1; Power itera-
tion step J ; Epoch T ; Hyper parameters λ, α, ξ, , ω.
2: Initialize model parameters Θ(0) = {Θ(0)U ,Θ(0)V }
3: for t = 1 to T do
4: /* Build the empirical risk term
5: {x1, y1} ← SampleMiniBatch(DF , B1; Θ(t))
6: yˆF ← Forward(x1; Θ(t))
7: Rˆ1 ← 1B1
∑
i δ(y
(i)
1 , yˆ
(i)
1 ) + λΩ(Θ
(t))
8: /* Build the counterfactual robust risk term
9: x0 ← SampleMiniBatch(DCF ∪ DF , B0; Θ(t))
10: yˆ0 ← Forward(x0; Θ(t))
11: Randomly generate an unit vector r(0)
12: for j = 1 to J do
13: /* Power iteration
14: yˆ′0 ← Forward(x0 + ξr(j); Θ(t))
15: g ← ∇rKL(yˆ0 ‖ yˆ′0)
16: r(j+1) ←  g‖g‖2
17: end for
18: yˆ′0 ← Forward(x0 + r(J); Θ(t))
19: Rˆ0 ← 1B0 KL(yˆ0 ‖ yˆ
′
0)
20: /* Updating the parameters via gradient descent.
21: Θ(t+1) ← Θ(t) − ω∇Θ(Rˆ1 + αRˆ0)
22: end for
Intuitively, one would expect the parity between event x and
any similar x′, no matter it is a factual or counterfactual,
could be controlled by optimizing δ˜x. Similar regime named
virtual adversarial training proposed by (Miyato et al., 2018),
is originally for improving local distributional smoothness
for semi-supervised learning from unlabeled samples. In
this work, we involve counterfactuals in optimization by the
defined robust risk, and find it is also a beneficial constraint
for improving fairness.
The objective function for our CRRM framework is defined
as
RˆCRR(Yˆ ) =
1
MN
∑
x
I{Ox = 1}δx + δ˜x (26)
For observed events, we try to minimize both the robust
risk δ˜x and empirical risk δx; for the unobserved, as δx is
intractable, only δ˜x is involved. The empirical risk can be
defined as any surrogate loss for supervised learning, e.g.
mean-squared-error. For the robust risk, it is tractable by a
power iteration (Miyato et al., 2018) approach.
The bias of RˆCRR(Yˆ ), like previously done for the
RˆIPS(Yˆ ), can be easily derived by
Bias(RˆCRR(Yˆ )) =
1
MN
∑
x
δx
(
1−Ox − δ˜x
δx
)
(27)
Unlike the ERM and IPS estimator, the δ˜x/δx identifies
that it may be beneficial to ”penalize” small empirical risk
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individuals with overestimating robust risk, and vice versa,
for uniform performance among users.
Algorithm 1 details our CRRM framework, where train-
able embeddings for users and items are ΘU ∈ RM×d and
ΘV ∈ RN×d. The input hyper parameters include: regular-
ization term λ, conterfactual risk weight α, robust radius ξ,
perturbation radius , learning rate ω, power iteration step J
and total learning epoch T , though we find few of them need
being finely tuned in practice. Their setups are discussed in
experiments section.
6.2. Bounding the risk over counterfactuals
Definition 2 (CRRM for recommendation). Given a hypoth-
esis space H of predictions as Yˆ , and CRRM’s objective
function Rˆ(Yˆ ) from Eq.(26) , the algorithm selects Yˆ ∈ H
that optimizes:
Yˆ = arg min
Y ′∈H
RˆCRR(Y
′) (28)
To illustrate the validity and principle of our CRRM ap-
proach, we state the following bound, where only finite
hypothesis setH is considered for the sake of conciseness.
Theorem 3 (Generalization error bound of CRRM).
For any finite hypothesis space of predictions H =
{Yˆ1, . . . , Yˆ|H|}, and empirical loss δx is bounded 0 ≤ δx ≤
∆, ∀x, the true risk R(Yˆ ) of our CRR minimizer Yˆ from
H, is bounded with probability 1− η by:
R(Yˆ ) ≤RˆCRR(Yˆ ) + 1
MN
∑
x
δx
(
1− 1
βx
)
+
∆
MN
√
log(2|H|/η)
2
√√√√∑
x
(
1 +
1
βx
)2
(29)
where βx := δx/δ˜x and we assume βx > 0 ∀x.
This generalization error bound is constructive, as it moti-
vates a trade-off between fairness and effectiveness which
does not occur in ERM. In particular, overestimating δ˜x
for small δx individuals could facilitate fairness as well as
the first bias term above. However, larger variance would
appear in the second term at the same time. Fortunately,
in most scenarios, our propensity-agnostic CRRM method
empirically benefits significantly, both in fairness and gen-
eralization, from the additional applied fairness constraint.
We will demonstrate it in next section.
7. Experiments
In this section, we perform experiments to explore the
performance of proposed CRRM, in terms of both global
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Figure 6. Estimate of Y¯n under two different setting of demograph-
ics, left: homogeneous, right: heterogeneous. Green dot lines are
the maximum and minimum of µl among all groups, and red one
is the average of all.
Table 1. mU and gU vary under data sparsity.
Sparsity 0.1% 0.5% 1%
Metric mU gU mU gU mU gU
LR 0.27 0.53 0.04 0.47 0.05 0.51
MF 0.32 0.50 0.29 0.52 0.20 0.52
IPS 0.39 0.53 0.34 0.52 0.27 0.52
SNIPS 0.40 0.54 0.32 0.50 0.30 0.51
CRRM 0.47 0.60 0.36 0.60 0.23 0.57
utility and Gini fairness. Furthermore, additional experi-
ments on real-world data sets (Yahoo2 and Coat) are con-
ducted to compare CRRM with other methods, according
to the commonly used measurements, e.g. MSE, AUC. We
here consider logistic regression (LR), matrix factorization
(MF-naive), inverse propensity score based MF (MF-IPS)
(Schnabel et al., 2016), self-normalized IPS (MF-SNIPS)
(Swaminathan & Joachims, 2015) and MF incorporated in
our CRRM framework (MF-CRRM).
7.1. Synthetic task
The experimental setup is similar as the motivating example
done in Section 4.1, but we supplement the heterogeneous
demographics setting, i.e. each user’s average preference is
different, and extend the scale to M = 10, N = 1000. For
experiments on the non-uniform φc, each time φc decides
the top 1 item for each user, and collects the users’ feedback.
Then it learns from the logged data, and continues to give
next round of top 1 recommendation.
How does demographic heterogeneity influence Y¯n’s
property by RCTs and ERM-based policy? We want
to compare the performance of Y¯n with φt and φc, with
varying heterogeneity, in the synthetic task. The results are
shown in Fig.6, where the x-axis is the observed events ratio.
With homogeneous demographics in Fig.6a, the Y¯n obtained
by ERM policy is much higher than the global average, and
φt converges to global average with high confidence. How-
ever, with strongly heterogeneous demographics defined
in section 5.4, the Fig.6b displays high variance of the φt.
2https://webscope.sandbox.yahoo.com/
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Table 2. Test MSE and AUC on real-world data sets.
COAT YAHOO
MSE AUC MSE AUC
MF-naive 0.656 0.681 0.340 0.687
MF-IPS 0.714 0.687 0.332 0.666
MF-SNIPS 0.605 0.684 0.325 0.667
MF-CRRM 0.277 0.717 0.216 0.713
Table 3. Test GI and gU on real-world data sets.
COAT YAHOO
GI gU GI gU
MF-naive 0.351 0.486 0.549 0.274
MF-IPS 0.333 0.508 0.558 0.264
MF-SNIPS 0.341 0.501 0.559 0.264
MF-CRRM 0.316 0.538 0.538 0.290
Unlike in homogeneous setting, the blue band converges
much slower with sampling ratio increasing. Besides, the or-
ange line (φc) also has deteriorating performance compared
with before. The result demonstrates that heterogeneity
of demographics can cause failure of RCTs-based IPS be-
cause of high variance incurred by Y¯n, and also do harm to
ERM-based φc in practice.
Does CRRM improve fairness and generalization? Re-
sults on strong demographic heterogeneity are reported in
Table 1, where mU is the minimum of user’s enjoyed util-
ity. We test our CRRM method against LR, naive MF and
IPS-based MF, and significant superiority of our method
is witnessed. The MF-CRRM substantially perform better
on both fairness and effectiveness in general, as it gains
the best mU and gU almost under each sparsity setting.
By contrast, MF-IPS with propensity scores learned from
MAR data with 10% of number of MANR data, does not
win over naive MF, due to high variance caused by Y¯n under
heterogeneous demographics.
7.2. Real-world data sets
Further experiments conducted on two real-world data sets,
which both collected a small test set where users are pro-
vided randomly displayed items for labeling. Following
previous works’ setting, we train all models on MNAR
training setDc, and test them on MAR test set. More details
about experimental setup are in appendix F.2.
Yahoo ! R3 Data Set. This is a user-song rating data set
(Marlin & Zemel, 2009), where MNAR training set has over
300K ratings for songs that were selected by users. The test
set contains ratings by 5400 users who were asked to rate
10 randomly selected songs.
Coat Shopping Data Set. This data set was collected and
used in (Schnabel et al., 2016), which contains 290 users and
300 items. Each user self-selected 24 items, and additional
16 items were randomly drawn for them to rate.
Results. Results are reported by Table 2 and Table 3, where
our CRRM substantially wins over other baselines on both
data sets, either in effectiveness metric gU, MSE, AUC
or in fairness metric GI. Unlike other IPS-based methods,
CRRM has much lower cost since it does not need additional
RCTs. It contributes to less variance via controlling both
robust risk and factual risk, thus facilitating generalization
without RCTs, as presented in Theorem 3. It should be noted
that on YAHOO data set, for computation efficiency, our
CRRM only sampling 0.1% fromDF ∪DCF for optimizing
on the Rˆ0 in each epoch, which sheds light on our CRRM’s
promising prospects in real-world recommender system.
8. Discussion & Conclusion
In this work, we focus on mitigating MNAR bias and unfair
policy, which are ubiquitous in recommendation. Previous
works tend to leverage empirical outcome mean Y¯n from
small RCTs for correcting MNAR bias, e.g. IPS family.
However, our study on the bias of these RCTs-based IPS
estimator, with introducing more general different mean de-
mographics, identifies the risk estimator with Y¯n sacrifices
the least favorable group for ensuring average performance.
We therefore propose an easy-to-use and RCTs-free coun-
terfactual robust risk minimization framework, in order to
circumvent the cost of RCTs, and mitigate the unfairness in
previous works. The key insight of our CRRM is to balance
between robust and factual risk, thus both reducing bias and
facilitating fairness, explained by the generalization bound
in our Theorem 3. Moreover, by random sampling when
alternative events set is large, our algorithm only costs a
little additional computation, thus being scalable to large
recommender systems.
We conjecture that the cutting edge sampling approaches
(Wang et al., 2020), rather than randomly sampling from all
events, can be plugged in our framework for further improve-
ment. Besides, other existing models for recommendation,
e.g. deep factorization machine (Guo et al., 2017), graph
neural networks (Fan et al., 2019), can be retrofit with our
CRRM for even better results.
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Beyond Randomized Trials: Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 (Least favorable group’s utility and Gini index). Assume that µˆ1 ≤ µˆ2 · · · ≤ µˆL, controlling the worst-case
µˆ1 to protect the minority group can improve fairness, by virtue of controlling the supremum of the GI as
0 ≤ GI ≤ 1− 1
L
− L− 1
CumL
µˆ1 (A.1)
if and only if µˆ1 = µˆ2 = · · · = µˆL the equality holds.
Proof.
GI = 1− 1
L×CumL
L∑
l=1
(
l−1∑
l′=1
µˆl′ +
l∑
l′=1
µˆl′
)
(A.2)
= 1− 1
L×CumL
(
2
L∑
l=1
l−1∑
l′=1
µˆl′ +
L∑
l=1
µˆl
)
(A.3)
= 1− 1
L
− 2
L×CumL ×
L∑
l=1
l−1∑
l′=1
µˆl′ (A.4)
≤ 1− 1
L
− L− 1
CumL
µˆ1 (A.5)
where the last inequality holds because
L∑
l=1
l−1∑
l′=1
µˆl′ ≥
L∑
l=1
(l − 1)µˆ1 = L(L− 1)
2
µˆ1 (A.6)
B. Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 (Bias of the least favorable group’s risk). The bias of IPS risk suffered by the least favorable group U1, has a
lower bound as
Bias(RˆIPS(Yˆ | X1)) ≥
(
1− Y¯n
µ1
)
1
|X1|
∑
x
δx (B.1)
Proof. It is easy to derive that
Ox = P(O+ | y, x) = P(y | O+, x)P(O+ | x)
P(y | x) (B.2)
Zˆx = Pˆ(O+ | y) = Pˆ(y | O+)Pˆ(O+)
Pˆ(y)
(B.3)
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Such that, we concentrate on Ox/Zˆx in the Eq.(15):
Ox
Zˆx
=
P(y | O+, x)
Pˆ(y | O+)
× P(O+ | x)
Pˆ(O+)
× Pˆ(y)
P(y | x) (B.4)
≤ Pˆ(y)
P(y | x) (B.5)
=
1
µ1
Pˆ(y) (B.6)
The second inequality Eq.(B.5) comes from the fact that the least favorable group U1’s true average preference must be less
than the empirical average. Combining the result above and Eq.(15) yields the result.
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Definition C.1 (Triangular Array (TA)). A triangular array of random variables is like
X11
X21 X22
X31 X32 X33
...
(C.1)
For each row n, the random variables Xn1 . . . Xnn are assumed independent, with E(Xnk) = µnk, and Var(Xnk) <∞.
We denote this triangular array as TA(Xn,k) henceforth.
Definition C.2 (Lindeberg’s condition (Zabell, 1995)). For random variables Y1, Y2, . . . Yn, we have s2n =
∑n
i=1 σ
2
i where
the variance σ2i of Yi is finite ∀i. We define a triangular array as TA( 1sn (Yi − µ)), which satisfies Lindeberg’s condition if
for
Λn() =
n∑
i=1
E
(
(
Yi
sn
)2I{|Yi| ≥ sn}
)
(C.2)
we have
lim
n→∞Λn() = 0 (C.3)
Lemma C.1 (Lindeberg’s condition under SMDV). Given Yi ∼ pF(µ, σ20) + (1− p)F(µ, σ21), and σ1 > σ0 ≥ 1, if the
variance is controllable, namely
lim
n→∞
1
s2n
σ21 → 0 (C.4)
then the TA( 1sn (Yi − µ)) satisfies Lindeberg’s condition.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that µ = 0, and let Y a random variable distributed like every Yi, then for  > 0,
Λn() =
n∑
i=1
E
(
(
Yi
sn
)2I{|Yi| ≥ sn}
)
(C.5)
=
p
s2n
n∑
i=1
E
(
Y 2I{|Y | ≥ sn
σ0
}
)
+
1− p
s2n
n∑
i=1
E
(
Y 2I{|Y | ≥ sn
σ1
}
)
(C.6)
≤ n
s2n
E
(
Y 2I{|Y | ≥ 
√
s2n
σ20
}
)
+
n
s2n
E
(
Y 2I{|Y | ≥ 
√
s2n
σ21
}
)
(C.7)
≤ E
(
Y 2I{|Y | ≥ 
√
s2n
σ20
}
)
+ E
(
Y 2I{|Y | ≥ 
√
s2n
σ21
}
)
(C.8)
in which the second inequality holds because it is easy to derive that s2n ≥ n. When n→∞, the last two terms converge to
zero, because of the condition set in Eq.(C.4).
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Theorem 1 (Asymptotic normality under SMDV). Let s2n =
∑n
i=1(pσ
2
0 + (1− p)σ21), under SMDV assumption, if
lim
n→∞
1
s2n
σ21 → 0 (C.9)
then the empirical mean Y¯n satisfies asymptotic normality as
n
sn
(Y¯n − µ) d→ N (0, 1) (C.10)
Proof. It is easy to derive that the summation over the n-th row of TA( 1sn (Yi − µ)) is nsn (Y¯n − µ). Based on the condition
set by Eq.(C.9), applying Lemma C.1 yields the result that TA( 1sn (Yi − µ)) satisfies Lindeberg’s condition, namely
lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
E
(
(
Yi
sn
)2I{|Yi| ≥ sn}
)
= 0 (C.11)
From the Lindeberg-Fellar Central Limit Theorem (CLT) (Feller, 2008), the summation over the each row of TA( 1sn (Yi−µ))
converges to a zero-mean unit variance Gaussian distribution, namely
n∑
i=1
(
1
sn
(Yi − µ)
)
=
n
sn
(Y¯n − µ) d→ N (0, 1) (C.12)
D. Proof of Theorem 2
First, we introduce Hoeffding’s lemma on bounded random variables (Hoeffding, 1994) without proof.
Lemma D.1 (Hoeffding’s lemma (Hoeffding, 1994)). if a ≤ X ≤ b with probability 1, and E(X) = 0, then X is
sub-Gaussian with parameter (b−a)
2
4 .
Theorem 2 (Tail bound under strong heterogeneity). Given the Yi ∼
∑L
l=1 plF(µl), where F(µl) ∈ [al, bl], then
Y¯n ≤
L∑
l=1
plµl +
L∑
l=1
pl(bl − al)
√
1
2n
log
1
η
(D.1)
with probability 1− η. Specifically when the sub-Gaussian parameters are all same, i.e. bl − al = 1,∀l, we have
Y¯n ≤
L∑
l=1
plµl +
√
1
2n
log
1
η
(D.2)
Moreover, For the bias of IPS estimator on the least favorable group, we have
Bias(RˆIPS(Yˆ | X1))
≥
∑
x
δx
|X1| −
1
µ1
(∑
l
plµl +
√
1
2n
log
1
η
)∑
x
δx
|X1|
(D.3)
Proof. From the definition of Yi and Y¯n, it is easy to derive
E(Y¯n) = E(Yi) =
L∑
l=1
plµl (D.4)
And the interval of Yi is
Yi ∈ [
L∑
l=1
plal︸ ︷︷ ︸
a˜i
,
L∑
l=1
plbl︸ ︷︷ ︸
b˜i
] (D.5)
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Applying Hoeffding’s inequality for Yn yields
P(Y¯n − E(Y¯n) ≥ ) ≤ exp
(
−2n22∑n
i=1(b˜i − a˜i)2
)
= η (D.6)
therefore
Y¯n − E(Y¯n) ≤
L∑
l=1
pl(bl − al)
√
1
2n
log
1
η
(D.7)
E. Proof of Theorem 3
Lemma E.1 (Bias of counterfactual robust risk). Let δx the empirical risk, and δ˜x the robust risk, for bounded δx ≤ ∆, we
have
Bias(RˆCRR(Yˆ )) ≤ 1
MN
∑
x
δx
(
1− 1
βx
)
(E.1)
Proof.
Bias(RˆCRR(Yˆ )) = R(Yˆ )− EO(RˆCRR(Yˆ )) (E.2)
=
1
MN
∑
x
δx − EO
(∑
x
1
MN
(I{Ox = 1}δx + δ˜x)
)
(E.3)
=
1
MN
∑
x
(δx − (Oxδx + δ˜x)) (E.4)
=
1
MN
∑
x
((1−Ox)δx − δ˜x) (E.5)
≤ 1
MN
∑
x
(δx − δ˜x) (E.6)
because Ox ∈ [0, 1]. Taking the δx out of the brace leads to the final result.
Theorem 3 (Generalization error bound of CRRM). For any finite hypothesis space of predictionsH = {Yˆ1, . . . , Yˆ|H|},
and empirical loss δx is bounded δx ≤ ∆, ∀x, the true risk R(Yˆ ) of our CRR minimizer Yˆ from H, is bounded with
probability 1− η by:
R(Yˆ ) ≤RˆCRR(Yˆ ) + 1
MN
∑
x
δx
(
1− 1
βx
)
+
∆
MN
√
log(2|H|/η)
2
√√√√∑
x
(
1 +
1
βx
)2 (E.7)
where βx := δx/δ˜x and we assume βx > 0 ∀x.
Proof. For notation simplicity, we omit the subscript CRR next.
R(Yˆ ) = R(Yˆ )− EO(Rˆ(Yˆ )) + EO(Rˆ(Yˆ )) (E.8)
= Bias(Rˆ(Yˆ )) + EO(Rˆ(Yˆ )) (E.9)
≤ 1
MN
∑
x
(δx − δ˜x) + EO(Rˆ(Yˆ )) (E.10)
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which follows from Lemma E.1. Considering Hoeffding inequality and union bounds, we are now going to bound the
following
P
(
|Rˆ(Yˆ )− EORˆ(Yˆ )| ≤ 
)
≥ 1− η (E.11)
⇐ P
(
max
Yˆh
|Rˆ(Yˆh)− EORˆ(Yˆh)| ≤ 
)
≥ 1− η (E.12)
⇔ P
⋃
Yˆh
|Rˆ(Yˆh)− EORˆ(Yˆh)| ≥ 
 < η (E.13)
⇐
|H|∑
h=1
P
(
|Rˆ(Yˆh)− EORˆ(Yˆh)| ≥ 
)
< η (E.14)
⇐ |H| × 2 exp
 −22M2N2∑
x δ
2
x
(
1 + 1βx
)2
 < η (E.15)
solving for  yields the bound that
|Rˆ(Yˆ )− EORˆ(Yˆ )| ≤ 1
MN
√
log(2|H|/2)
2
√√√√∑
x
δ2x
(
1 +
1
βx
)2
(E.16)
As we know that δx ≤ ∆, so it is easy to derive the final bound as
EORˆ(Yˆ ) ≤ Rˆ(Yˆ ) + ∆
MN
√
log(2|H|/η)
2
√√√√∑
x
(
1 +
1
βx
)2
(E.17)
Substitute EORˆ(Yˆ ) in Eq.(E.10) yields the final result.
F. Experimental setup
F.1. Simulation Tasks
For motivating example, we build a 5× 5 matrix as the users’ preference over each item, where each element is generated
uniformly within [0, 1], so they are homogeneous. For simulating user’s behavior, we introduce an additional latent variable
uniformly drawn from [0, 1], such that for each time an event x appears, the click happens when the latent variable is smaller
than y. We adopt a bandit feedback setting here, that is, the policy φc firstly ranks the Top-1 predicted reward item for each
user, collects the feedbacks as click or not click; then we do policy learning via ERM from these logged feedbacks. For
controlled experiment, we perform the same setting for an uniform policy φt as well.
After 100 epochs of logging feedbacks and learning policy, we can calculate the empirical outcome distribution from
the observed logged data, e.g. Pˆc1(Y | X) from Dc and Pˆt1(Y | X) from Dt. The Fig.F.1 demonstrates the Pˆc1(Y | X),
generated by the non-uniform policy φc, compared with the true P(Y | X). Significant bias of the estimated Pˆc1(Y | X)
is depicted in Fig.F.2b, which is caused by inaccurately modeling on the observed events, with non-uniform policy and
assuming that Pˆc1(Y | X) = P(Y | X). From Fig.3b we observe that the φc causes devastating reduction of diversity to the
system, all items except for item #0 are underrepresented, because they are relatively less interested by the users in average.
The insufficient exploration over items causes large bias of estimated marginal distribution over items, shown in Fig.F.2a, i.e.
bias of Pˆc1(Y | V = 0) is near zero, while others’ are large.
F.2. Real-world data
The original data set contains ratings from 1 to 5, we binarize it by setting 3 as threshold. For fair comparison, we tune hyper
parameters for all MF-based methods: regularization term λ ∈ {10−3, 0.01, 0.1, 1}, learning rate ω ∈ {0.01, 0.05, 0.1},
embedding size d = 4, and report the results on the best parameters. Speicifically for our CRRM, we simply maintain
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Figure F.1. Comparison between the generated preference and empirically estimated preference by φc.
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(a) Bias of item-wise preference.
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Figure F.2. Analysis of simulation results of the motivating example.
 = 0.1, ξ = 1, α = 1, and J = 1 all the time. For the IPS methods, propensity scores are learned by naive Bayes estimator
from 5% of MAR test set.
